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This paper develops a proposal for an international multilevel competition policy system, 
which draws on the insights of the analysis of multilevel systems of institutions. In doing so, 
it targets to contribute to bridge a gap in the current world economic order, i.e. the 
supranational governance of private international restrictions to market competition. Such a 
governance can effectively be designed against the background of a combination of the well-
known nondiscrimination principle and a lead jurisdiction model. Put very briefly, 
competition policy on the global level restricts itself to the selection and appointment of 
appropriate lead jurisdictions for concrete cross-border antitrust cases, while the substantive 
treatment remains within the competence of the existing national and regional-supranational 
antitrust regimes.  
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1. International Competition Policy as a Multilevel System 
The current world economic order addresses governmental restrictions to international 
competition via the trade policy framework of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
However, six decades after the vision of a comprehensive International Trade Organisation 
(ITO; the so-called Havana Charta), the complementary protection of international 
competition against restrictions by private enterprises (cartels, market domination, abusive 
behaviour) is still missing. Through the years of academic and political discussion about 
international competition policy, two insights have increasingly received support: 
-  In the face of an ongoing internationalisation of business activities along with a 
globalisation process of competition and markets, anticompetitive practices like 
cartels, predatory and exclusionary strategies, and monopolising (or otherwise 
anticompetitive) mergers have also internationalised. As a consequence, global 
welfare cannot be maximised without an internationally coordinated competition 
policy.
1 The reliance on national competition policy regimes does not suffice anymore 
due to regulatory gaps, for instance, negative externalities from strategic competition 
policies, effects on markets in smaller and developing countries, business and 
administration costs of multiple parallel antitrust proceedings, and jurisdictional 
conflicts over antitrust cases.
2 Thus, on one hand, some sort of an international 
competition policy regime is necessary. 
-  On the other hand, the hitherto existing efforts to establish global competition rules 
and respective enforcement institutions have failed. Along with politico-economic 
reasons, the resistance to create and implement a powerful global antitrust authority 
are supported by economic insights, for instance, information asymmetries (closeness 
of the regulators to the regulated markets and industries), diverging competition policy 
preferences across countries, and administration costs (international bureaucracy).
3 
Therefore, neither a purely decentralised solution (national competition regimes), nor a 
strongly centralised solution (domination of global rules and authorities) seems feasible. 
Instead, the creation of supranational competition policy competences can realistically merely 
complement the further on existing national and supranational (e.g. common European Union 
competition policy) regimes. This fits with the theoretical insights that neither extreme 
decentralism, nor extreme centralism leads to a global optimum. 
                                                 
1 See Barros/Cabral (1994); Head/Ries (1997); Kaiser/Vosgerau (2000); Tay/Willmann (2005); 
Haucap/Müller/Wey (2006). 
2 See e.g. Jacquemin (1995); Fox (2000); Klodt (2001); ICN (2002); Budzinski (2003a: 4-10); Jenny (2003a, 
2003b).  
3 See e.g. Hauser/Schoene (1994); Smets/Van Cayseele (1995); Budzinski (2003a: 11-18); Epstein/Greve (2004); 
McGinnis (2004); Stephan (2004). Budzinski: International Competition Policy System  3
As a consequence, both the academic discourse and the policy practice have increasingly 
focused on intermediate solutions, encompassing elements of decentralised and centralised 
solutions. In particular, concepts of network governance have gained increasing popularity 
within various disciplines, e.g. political, legal, and social sciences as well as in economics. 
Regarding international competition policy, Tarullo (2000) develops a regulatory-
convergence approach, in which systematic network cooperation provides “a mechanism for 
structuring and monitoring the mutual expectations of states” (p. 495) in order to make 
national regulations more congruent across interacting jurisdictions. He vehemently argues in 
favour of a participation of the existing antitrust agencies in the process of generating an 
international regime. In a compatible approach, Maher (2002) views competition policy 
networks to be an important regime-building factor and, in this sense, “a prerequisite to any 
greater internationalisation” (p. 114). Consequently, the emphasis is predominantly on the 
way towards international competition governance and to a lesser extent on the sustainable 
design of the regime. First (2003) also focuses on identifying superior avenues towards an 
international competition policy regime. He develops an interesting and challenging concept 
of mapping the existing antitrust networks. In doings so, he emphasises the fact that a number 
of existing antitrust regimes must be characterised as complex institutional arrangements 
(‘networks’) themselves. Against the background of the U.S. experience (antitrust 
federalism), First (2003) and O’Connor (2002) emphasise benefits of decentralised regime 
elements.
4 Additionally, the policy sphere has embraced network governance with the 
introduction of the International Competition Network (ICN) (Budzinski 2004), which – 
despite being rather informal – represents the currently most viable avenue towards 
international competition policy coordination after the efforts to introduce competition rules 
in the WTO Doha round have eventually failed (Bode/Budzinski 2006).  
If international competition policy competences are introduced in addition to the prevailing 
national and regional-supranational regimes, then a multilevel system of competition policy 
competences (Budzinski 2003a: 39-52; Kerber 2003) comes into existence. Reconstructing the 
problem of a coordinated international system of competition policies in terms of a multilevel 
system can serve as a framework for analysing intermediate institutional arrangements, 
combining coherence and diversity or balancing centralising with decentralising elements and 
forces. Within such a multilevel system, the allocation and delimitation of competences 
represents a crucial issue. 
2. Fundamentals of an International Multilevel System of Competition 
Policies 
The concept of multilevel systems represents an analytical framework to describe and model 
complex regimes, which include of a multitude of interrelated institutions and organisations. 
                                                 
4 “My overall view is that for a system of antitrust enforcement to remain dynamic, overcentralization must be 
avoided and some degree of chaos tolerated” First (2003, p. 24). Budzinski: International Competition Policy System  4
Generally speaking, a system consists of elements and interrelations (or, synonymously, 
interconnections). If the (interrelated) elements are located on more than one level, a 
multilevel system is constituted. Within such a system, interrelations occur regarding two 
dimensions:  vertical interrelations between elements on different levels and horizontal 
interrelations between elements of one and the same level. Theoretically, also diagonal 
interrelations between non-vertically interrelated elements of different levels are possible. If 
they occur comprehensively, a true network result. Thus, networks qualify as an extreme 
variant of a multilevel system.  
Fig. 1 shows a stylised multilevel system with focus on horizontal and vertical interrelations. 
Though it does not represent a necessary condition, multilevel systems, more often than not, 










Fig 1: Stylised Multilevel System (Source: Kerber 2003: 275) 
 
In respect to complex international competition policy regimes, possible levels are global, 
regional-supranational, national, regional-subnational, and local. The elements are 
competition policy authorities (antitrust agencies, competent ministries, courts, etc.) and 
antitrust institutions (substantive rules, procedural rules, assessment techniques, enforcement 
practices, etc.). In order to constitute a system, however, these elements have to be 
interrelated. These interrelations are represented by the allocation and delimitation of 
competition policy competences. 
Drawing on the current structure of antitrust in the world and in the leading jurisdictions, the 
following vertical structure of an international multilevel system of competition policies is 
assumed. The top level is global, thus paying tribute to the process of market globalisation. 
                                                 
5 The characterisations ‘upward’ and ‘downward’ refer to the visualisation of a multilevel system according to 
fig. 1 and do not imply assessments of importance or superiority versus inferiority. In particular, no prejudice 
about the competence (neither in a positive nor in a normative sense) of a level to exert jurisdiction over an 
antitrust case is implied. In the context of this paper, top-down only means from centralised to decentralised, 
e.g. from global to local.  Budzinski: International Competition Policy System  5
The second level, however, is also supranational. It consists of competition policy regimes 
that are international, albeit regionally limited. A natural example – and the most 
comprehensively developed one – is the competition policy of the EU. However, there is a 
distinct number of additional free trade areas and economic integration projects, which either 
entail competition policy provisions or are likely to or possess potential to develop some in 
the future. The third level is the one of nationwide competition policy regimes, like the federal 
antitrust policy of the U.S., Japan, or Germany. Eventually, a fourth level refers to subnational 
competition policy regimes, like the antitrust policy efforts of the U.S. states or the State 
Cartel Offices in Germany. The delimitation of ‘subnational’, ‘national’, and ‘supranational’ 
follows the historically-originated current structure of nations, their associations and 
confederations, and their internal institutional designs. As a consequence, competition policy 
regimes with significantly differing extent, power, or meaning can be located at the same 
level. However, every alternative vertical structure of levels would be subject to the 
disadvantage of being illusory. 
Competence allocation plays an important role in regard to the performance of the system as a 
whole. It is sensitive for the sustainable integration of coherence and diversity in order to 
create a complex but coherent international competition policy regime. The concept of 
multilevel systems allows for a systematic, theory-based analysis of such regimes. 
Complexity and diversity are explicitly modelled by the existence of more than one level of 
jurisdiction and the possibility of having more than one institution/agency at each level 
(variety of elements). Coherence is represented in the system by the vertical and horizontal 
interrelations between the elements, i.e. by the design of the interfaces. In other words, the 
allocation and delimitation of competences decides whether coherence within the system can 
be achieved without eroding the multilevel character. Thus, the choice of the rules, which 
determine competence allocation and delimitation, represent a decisive problem in regard to 
the workability of a multilevel system. 
In the framework of multilevel systems, the problem of competence allocation and 
delimitation possesses a number of dimensions: 
-  Vertical and horizontal allocation of competences (dimension I): competences are 
allocated vertically between the levels (which is the competent level?) and 
horizontally among the authorities and institutions of the same level (which is the 
competent institution/authority on a specific level?). Additionally, problems of 
diagonal delimitation can occur in the case of allocative effects between a jurisdiction 
on a downward level and a jurisdiction on an upward level if the two jurisdictions are 
not vertically interrelated.
6  
-  Institutional and enforcement competences (dimension II): competition policy regimes 
can consist of a number of institutional competences. The competence to create, 
                                                 
6 Imagine, e.g., the question of competence allocation between the EU (supranational but regionally limited 
level) and Canada (national level but not within the regional scope of the EU). Budzinski: International Competition Policy System  6
implement and shape competition rules (dimension IIa) can be differently allocated 
than the competence to apply antitrust institutions (dimension IIb) or the competence 
to enforce the applied rules (dimension IIc). Moreover, substantive rules and 
procedural rules can be distinguished and allocated in a different way. Regarding any 
specific antitrust case, it must be decided, which institution (set of competition rules) 
is applied and which agency is responsible. For instance, a downward level agency can 
be competent in enforcing the institutions of an upward level agency. Or, an upward 
level agency only consists of procedural rules to enforce downward level substantive 
institutions. Similarly, on one and the same level agency A (institution Φ) can be 
competent in moulding substantive rules, whereas agency B (institution Ω) is 
responsible to apply them (e.g. a domestic institution might be applied by a foreign 
agency). Consequently, the competence allocation regarding rule-making can differ 
from the one regarding rule-application and enforcement. 
  
- Exclusive  and  concurrent  allocation of competences (dimension III): the competence 
to exert jurisdiction over a specific antitrust case can be exclusively allocated to one 
institution and one agency. For instance, a specific case may fall exclusively under the 
European competition rules and jurisdiction is exclusively allocated to the European 
Commission. If competence allocation and delimitation is ambiguous, concurrent 
jurisdiction emerges. For instance, the German Cartel Office might want to challenge 
a cartel, applying European competition rules. At the same time, the U.S. Federal 
Trade Commission pursues the same cartel under federal U.S. laws. 
-  Sustainable and temporary competence allocation (dimension IV): Balancing 
centralising and decentralising forces within the system is a dynamic problem. 
Multilevel systems evolve along with competence allocation and delimitation. This 
can lead to two kinds of deficiency: (i) a creeping process of centralisation, 
incrementally eroding the benefits of having decentralised elements, and (ii) a 
creeping process of decay, incrementally eroding the benefits of having centralised 
elements. Therefore, the allocation and delimitation of competences must not only 
focus on stationary combination of advantages of centralism and decentralism. It must 
also secure the sustainability of the system by controlling and balancing the 
centralising and decentralising forces. However, this need not imply that the once-
implemented allocation and delimitation of competences must not be changed. 
Eventually, the principle structure of competition policy regimes matters in terms of 
centralism and decentralism. Basic regime types include the court system, the administration 
system, and the private litigation system.  
-  In the court system, final decisions are made by competition courts. A government 
attorney or a competent public agency files law suits against anticompetitive business 
arrangements and practices and is forced to prove its allegations. With respect to the 
U.S. antitrust system, it is argued that the court system offers superior capabilities in 
terms of flexibility and innovation (e.g. Kovacic 1992, 2004). The reason is that Budzinski: International Competition Policy System  7
plaintiffs have incentives to offer contrary evidence and theories against the 
government advocates with the judge weighing the different positions and, maybe, 
calling for additional and independent expertise.
7 
-  In an administration system, the competent competition authority both investigates and 
decides about anticompetitive business arrangements and practices. Courts become 
involved only if the respective enterprises file an appeal against the administrative 
decision. In such a scenario, it becomes important to distinguish between a 
government authority (like the European Commission) and agency independence
8. 
The former is likely to experience difficulty withstanding distortionary influences 
from non-antitrust policy areas (and lobbyism), whereas the latter can focus 
exclusively on competition matters. Intraregime diversity may be more limited in 
administration systems due to the strong position of the competent agency.  
-  In the system of private litigation, no public authority apart of ‘ordinary’ courts is 
involved. The private parties themselves enforce competition law through law suits 
filed by the injured party of an anticompetitive arrangement or practice (e.g. vertically 
related parties like consumers, resellers, component suppliers, etc., or horizontally 
related parties like competitors). Although this obviously entails a number of problems 
if the overall regime is based on private litigation, elements of private litigation are 
included in many antitrust regimes. Private litigation plays an important role within 
the U.S. antitrust system and its meaning in the EU is increasing. Additionally, it has 
some regional importance in the enforcement of rules against unfair competition (e.g. 
delusive and untrue advertising, defamatory actions against competitors, incorrect 
price marking, etc.). 
These basic regime types rarely occur in their pure variant in real-world antitrust regimes. 
Instead, real-world regimes usually represent specific mixtures of the described basic 
elements. 
In summary, an international multilevel system of competition policies consists of  
-  a multitude of competition institutions, among many others global competition 
provisions, the EU competition rules, U.S. statutes like the Sherman Act, the German 
Act against Restraints of Competition, Californian antitrust provisions, etc. 
-  a multitude of antitrust authorities, among many others the U.S. Federal Trade 
Commission, the Canadian Competition Bureau, State Cartel Offices in Germany, the 
European Commission, some global instance, etc. 
                                                 
7 However, the regime is asymmetric. If the government authorities decide not to challenge an arrangement or 
practice – on whatever grounds – no court supervision occurs. 
8 A comprehensive example represents the European Central Bank. Within the antitrust world, the Federal Cartel 
Office of Germany possesses somewhat limited independence. Budzinski: International Competition Policy System  8
-  a multitude of differently designed regimes across the levels, including court systems, 
government administration systems, independent administration systems, elements of 
private litigation, and all kinds of mixed types. 
3. Nondiscrimination and Mandatory Lead Jurisdictions as Basic 
Competence Allocation Rules 
The workability of such an complex international multilevel system of competition policies 
demands intelligently-designed competence allocation and delimitation rules. Such rules can 
have very different designs, corresponding to differing performances. With regard to 
competition policy, respective comparative analyses highlight in particular two types of 
competition rules: the nondiscrimination rule and the mandatory lead jurisdiction model 
(Budzinski 2005: 177-244; 2006). 
-  The principle of nondiscrimination belongs to the most important and fundamental 
principles of the GATT-WTO-framework for international trade. Regarding 
international antitrust, an extended and modified nondiscrimination rule could 
incorporate the following elements (Trebilcock/Iacobucci 2004). Competition policy 
regimes are not allowed to discriminate between domestic and foreign producers and 
consumers.
9 In particular, they must not favour domestic consumers and/or producers 
at the expense of foreign ones or disadvantage foreign consumers and/or producers 
compared to domestic ones. This includes the design of the national and regional 
competition rules itself as well as the way they are enforced. Both a supervision or 
complaint and a sanction mechanism to identify and stop discriminating antitrust 
policies complement the antitrust nondiscrimination principle.  
The nondiscrimination rule limits the competence to claim extraterritorial jurisdiction 
by the legitimate interest of the foreign jurisdictions to design their domestic laws 
according to their own preferences (as long as they are non-discriminatory) (dimension 
I). The rule-making competences of each jurisdiction are limited to institutional 
arrangements that are non-discriminatory (dimension II). This excludes a number of 
popular rule designs, e.g. the exemption of pure export cartels from the general 
prohibition of cartels and surrogates. Nevertheless, rule-making competences 
(dimension IIa) remain exclusively on the downward (national and regional) levels – 
the (supranational) level gains no competence to create, design, and implement its own 
substantial institutions. In cases of discrimination and conflict, the upward level gains 
application and enforcement competences, however, in a limited sense. Only conflict 
resolution competences are assigned to the upward level, irrespective of whether they 
follow complaints by downward jurisdictions or result from supervision. This can 
mean competences to decide, which institutions of which downward jurisdictions 
                                                 
9 The inclusion of consumers represents an important extension of the trade-oriented variant of the 
nondiscrimination concept. Budzinski: International Competition Policy System  9
apply to a specific anticompetitive arrangement or practice (dimension IIb). It can also 
cover decisions about enforcement competences (dimension IIc). However, the 
upward level neither directly applies downward institutions, nor directly enforces 
them. An indirect rule-making competence might occur because the upward level 
decides whether complained-about competition rules or antitrust practices of 
downward jurisdictions violate the nondiscrimination principle or not – which can be a 
controversial matter. However, the upward level can only negatively condemn specific 
provisions but it cannot prescribe specifically-designed rules. 
-  The basic principle of the mandatory lead jurisdiction model is that if an 
anticompetitive arrangement or practice is to be reviewed by more than one 
competition policy regime (according to their respective standards), a lead jurisdiction 
reviews and decides the case vicariously for the other ones (Campbell/Trebilcock 
1997). An international panel decides about the appointment of a competent and 
appropriate lead jurisdiction in regard to a specific anticompetitive arrangement or 
practice.
10 So, the competence to deal with this case is allocated to the internationally 
chosen lead jurisdiction (both regarding authority and institution), which is obliged to 
pay attention to anticompetitive effects in other jurisdictions and entitled to call on 
other antitrust regimes for assistance.  
The rule-making competences of the national and regional-supranational regimes are 
left untouched, whereas the supranational level does not get substantive rule-making 
competence (dimension IIa). The enforcement competences are allocated to the lead 
jurisdiction (dimension IIc), which applies its own antitrust institutions. However, the 
decision concerning which competition rules are applied to a specific anticompetitive 
arrangement or practice is effectively allocated to the supranational level (dimension 
IIb) because it is competent choose the lead jurisdiction. Consequently, the mandatory 
lead jurisdiction model leads to an exclusive allocation of competences (dimension 
III). After the supranational level has exerted its exclusive competence to appoint the 
lead jurisdiction, the latter has exclusive competence to deal with the respective case.  
These two competence allocation principles complement each other with regard to the 
problems of international competition policy outlined in section 1. While the lead jurisdiction 
model heals the problems from multijurisdictional reviews and proceedings and tends to 
alleviate information asymmetries, the nondiscrimination rule ensures the respectfulness for 
different preferences across countries and considerably aggravates strategic behaviour. Both 
entail potentials to diminish jurisdictional conflicts over antitrust cases as well as limiting 
administrative costs from international bureaucracy.
11  
Both the nondiscrimination rule and the mandatory lead jurisdiction model imply that the top 
level neither prescribes concrete substantive provisions against cartels or abusive and 
                                                 
10 This represents a modified version of the suggestion by Campbell/Trebilcock (1997: 110-112). 
11 See for an elaborate theoretical analysis Budzinski (2005: 122-140, 203-207, 229-244; 2006). Budzinski: International Competition Policy System  10
predatory modes of enterprise behaviour, nor consists of a distinctive merger control. Instead, 
the upward allocation of competences is limited to the selection of competent jurisdictions as 
well as complaint and supervision competences. Therefore, these competence allocation rules 
predominantly address competence allocation between the top level and comparably close 
downward level(s). More distant downward levels, for instance subnational levels, which face 
substantive competition policy regime on upward levels, require additional competence 
allocation rules. On these downward levels, risks from overdecentralisation in the face of 
business internationalisation, causing welfare-decreasing cross-jurisdictional spill-over 
effects, are more imminent than such from centralising forces. Therefore, simple rules, which 
safeguard that anticompetitive arrangements and practices with cross-jurisdictional effects 
(regarding the addressed level) are allocated upwards, are required.  
The next section presents an example of how adequate competence allocation rules for a 
coherent and federalist governance of global competition could look like in a concrete way.  
4. The Levels of Competition Policy and their Interrelations 
4.1 The Global Level 
The preceding analysis leads to the conclusion that a real ‘global level’ represents a 
precondition for a sound governance of worldwide competition. However, the differentiated 
analysis of the multilevel approach allows for and requires a closer look on the competences 
that a global level inalienably needs in order to cope with its tasks. A combination of the two 
outlined competence allocation rules implies that an international competition policy regime 
does not require substantive antitrust laws at the global level.  
Nevertheless, the global level should be equipped with considerable competences, namely (i) 
selection of competent jurisdictions (which incompletely represents a rule-application 
competence) according to the mandatory lead jurisdiction model and (ii) combat 
discriminatory rules and practices on other levels according to the nondiscrimination 
principle. The latter may be called a limited rule-making competence – limited to the ban of 
discriminatory antitrust. However, there is a difference that is important from an institutional-
economic perspective. The global level is only entitled to prohibit discriminatory rules and 
practices. It cannot and must not prescribe how competition rules and antitrust practices on 
downward levels should look like. The most important aspect here is that (Hayek 1975; 
Kerber 1993; Wegner 1997)  
-  a prohibition excludes only one specific option from the non-determined set of 
possible options
12, whereas 
                                                 
12 The set of possible options is ex ante always indetermined because of the creative abilities of human agents to 
create formerly unknown – because non-existent – modes of behaviour and institutional arrangements (Wegner 
1997; Budzinski 2003c). Budzinski: International Competition Policy System  11
-  a prescription effectively eliminates any scope of selection and de facto excludes all 
the other options by prescribing one of them. 
In the first case, the downward levels maintain behavioural freedom, including the freedom to 
create innovative solutions. Each is effectively eroded in the second case. 
Consequently, fundamental rule-making competences and the remaining scope of rule-
application competences are not allocated to the top level. The same is true for direct 
enforcement competences. It is the lead jurisdiction, which applies their own or other 
competition rules to a given anticompetitive arrangement or practice and enforces the 
outcome of its proceedings. However, referring to the externality issue as the weakest point of 
both favoured competence allocation rules, the lead jurisdiction is expected to produce 
positive externalities (i.e. protect competition also in regard to other jurisdictions’ markets 
and consumers), which generates an incentive problem. Therefore, supervision competences 
must be additionally allocated to the global level.
13 One might call this a kind of indirect 
enforcement competence, but, again, upward competences only cover the ability to abolish 
deficient decisions of the lead jurisdiction regarding nondiscrimination and comity. The 
global level authorities’ are not competent to apply and enforce (whichever) competition law 
themselves. 
In order to handle the outlined competences, which are specified below, an agency is needed 
at the global level. Allow me to call it the International Competition Panel (ICP).
14 According 
to the combination of the mandatory lead jurisdiction model and the nondiscrimination rule, 
its competences can be specified to include the following three elements. 
-  Selection of Lead Jurisdiction 
The ICP appoints a lead jurisdiction, preferably from the second or third level. As a lead 
jurisdiction for a given anticompetitive arrangement or practice qualifies (i) regional 
gravity of the aggregate turnover of the participating enterprises, (ii) the absence of 
discriminatory provisions in the potentially competent competition policy regime, and (iii) 
willingness and experience of the potentially competent antitrust authorities to employ a 
world welfare standard, i.e. to safeguard comity to other jurisdictions’ markets and 
consumers. The lead jurisdiction receives full competences to deal with the respective 
anticompetitive arrangement or practice under the obligation of nondiscrimination and 
pursuance of the common welfare of all affected consumers irrespective of their location. 
- Supervision  and  Sanctions 
The ICP reviews the competition rules and codified practices of the downward levels’ 
antitrust regimes regarding violations of the nondiscrimination principle. In cases of 
                                                 
13 For instance, the necessity of an external monitoring of activities of downward level jurisdictions in an 
otherwise federal or decentralised regime is also emphasised by Figueiredo/Weingast (2005), arguing from a 
game-theoretic perspective on federalism and constitutional rules. 
14 My intention is not focused on names. Any other denomination of this agency would also be fine as long as it 
is equipped with the described competences. Budzinski: International Competition Policy System  12
discriminatory rules or practices, it demands the modification of the respective provisions 
(however, without prescribing alternative designs
15). If the respective competition policy 
regime refuses to adjust its rules and practices according to the requirements of the 
nondiscrimination principle, this regime is disqualified and suspended as lead jurisdiction. 
This procedure also applies safeguarding a minimum necessary nexus of downward 
competition policy regimes with an anticompetitive arrangement or practice to claim 
jurisdiction.
16 Additionally, the ICP supervises the review and decision process by the 
lead jurisdiction, but exclusively concerning violations of nondiscrimination. Potential 
sanctions are similar to the general nondiscrimination review procedure. 
-  Complaints and Conflict Resolution 
The ICP hears and reviews complaints from jurisdictions or enterprises (i) about decisions 
of the lead jurisdiction, which disregard foreign consumers and/or nondiscrimination, and 
(ii) about discriminatory rules or practices of downward level competition policy regimes 
(including insufficient nexus). Any complaints by parties to the case about wrong 
assessments by the competent antitrust authority or dissents regarding the facts of a case 
fall under the competency of the courts and appellation bodies of the lead jurisdiction. In 
this sense, ICP provides a forum to deal with conflicts between downward level 
jurisdictions. 
While the ICP represents the final instance regarding its supervision and conflict resolution 
tasks, an appellation body regarding its jurisdictional decisions (i.e. appointment of the 
appropriate lead jurisdiction) is needed. An international court could be one suitable solution, 
a second chamber of the panel another. The latter may be preferable in order to keep the 
selection procedure compact. Otherwise, transaction costs and the administrative burden on 
business would increase, deteriorating institutional efficiency. 
Anticompetitive arrangements and practices with more than negligible cross-jurisdictional 
effects concerning the downward levels fall under the described competences of the ICP. 
Regarding mergers and other interfirm alliances the following procedure could prove to be 
compact and efficient. According to the self-assessment of the participating enterprises, these 
arrangements are pre-notified to the ICP.
17 A standardised notification procedure could 
minimise filing efforts while providing the necessary information to decide about the 
                                                 
15 It remains within the competencies of the decentralised competition policy regimes to develop an institutional 
solution, which heals the discrimination problem. 
16 Claiming jurisdiction without a sufficient nexus to the respective arrangement can be interpreted as 
representing an indirect kind of discrimination. It is necessary to include the nexus issue in the supervision and 
sanction mechanism with respect to competition policy competences on national and subnational-regional 
levels. 
17 The self-assessment by the enterprises should not entail dangers of forum shopping because when assessing 
the cross-border effects, the respective enterprises are not choosing between different competition laws (since 
this decision is made by the ICP). Moreover, an ICP pre-notification of an anticompetitive arrangement or 
practice without considerable cross-border effects does not generate significant harm because the competence 
to substantially deal with the arrangement is allocated downwards anyhow. If only one downward level 
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appropriate lead jurisdiction. If arrangements with considerable cross-border effects are only 
notified to a downward level jurisdiction, then the receiving agency must delegate the 
notification to the ICP.
18 Concerning illegal cartels, which are usually performed secretly, and 
abusive behaviour, a notification to the ICP occurs according to the assessment of the 
downward level antitrust authorities, who discover them. In such cases, the ICP’s appointment 
of a lead jurisdiction must sometimes rely on provisional knowledge and hypotheses about the 
nature of the cartel or abuse. However, since – according to experience in anticartel 
interagency cooperation – overall cooperation between the affected regimes works 
considerably well in such cases due to similar interests, the appointment of the second- or 
third-best appropriate jurisdiction does not represent a serious problem. 
This leads towards the organisational design of the ICP. Actually, there are different ways to 
organise an agency with the above sketched competences. One obvious alternative would be 
to integrate the ICP within the WTO framework. This would complete the WTO as the 
primary organisation, which is responsible for the governance of global markets. With both 
public and private restraints of competition falling under the competence of the WTO, global 
competition would then be subject to coherent governance out of one single hand. The late 
completion of the postwar ITO vision clearly comes with considerable sympathy. However, it 
can be useful to sacrifice this ideal paragon in favour of a more practicable or consensuable 
solution. The major problem with a WTO competition policy is the significant difference 
between the prevailing mechanisms of international trade policy and the demands of a 
decentralised international competition policy system. It represents an important practical 
difference whether one deals with state action restricting trade or with private business 
behaviour, which might produce anticompetitive effects – with respect to timeframes, parties’ 
rights, economic analysis, etc. On the other hand, in the framework of an ICP, which is 
suggested here, the international authority only deals with public agencies – namely 
competition agencies – and their claims of jurisdiction and handling of assigned competences. 
Moreover, there are considerable overlaps, for instance, regarding discriminatory competition 
policy strategies (like selective non-enforcement of competition rules, promotion of outbound 
restrictions, etc.). Nevertheless, significant differences between the proposal in this paper and 
the current WTO architecture are obvious and they might prove difficult to overcome. 
Alternatively, the ICP could constitute a separate independent international agency. Such an 
agency must be designed to (i) represent adequately the downward level jurisdictions and (ii) 
keep procedures compact and efficient. The first requirement facilitates the constitution and 
implementation of the ICP. In order to avoid an international political bargaining game, the 
competition authorities of the existing national and supranational jurisdictions could serve as 
natural constituents and members of the ICP. To some extent, one of the constituting 
principles of the ICN serves as a paragon – namely aiming for a coordination among 
                                                 
18 Such cases are likely to occur only infrequently. If an arrangement affects more than one decentralised 
competition policy regime, the participating agencies are required to notify to more than one agency – and, at 
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competition authorities instead of among governments. Furthermore, an obvious advantage of 
this strategy would be the possibility to develop the ICP out of the popular ICN – albeit, it 
would more likely entail the characteristics of a replacement. 
Another organisational paragon for an international panel consisting of experts is represented 
by the European System of Central Banks or, more precisely, its major decision forum, the 
Governing Council (European Central Bank 2004). Drawing on this, the ICP Governing 
Chamber could consist of a board of appointed ICP directors and the presidents, governors, 
etc. of downward level antitrust authorities. However, in view of the second demand – 
compact and efficient procedures – the number of members of Governing Chamber must not 
be excessive. Therefore, not every jurisdiction can be an acting member of the Governing 
Chamber at a given point of time. Along with, say, 5 directors, the chamber should consist of 
a maximum of 10 national or supranational-regional representatives. A rotation system must 
ensure that none of the participating jurisdiction is disadvantaged concerning its 
representation in the Governing Chamber. This rotation system could be designed to reflect 
the differing importance and meaning of the downward level jurisdictions in the world of 
antitrust. National or supranational-regional competition policy regimes with a large 
population and/or large economic weight should more often join the chamber than smaller 
ones. An indicator, which combines measures of population and economic activity, is not too 
difficult to develop. In fact, this mirrors the upcoming rotation system regarding participation 
of national central bank governors in the Governing Council of the European Central Bank, 
which became necessary in the face of the enlargement of the EU and enters into force if the 
new members qualify for and subsequently join the European Currency Unit (Baldwin 2001; 
Hefeker 2002). Roughly, the organisational side mirrors the independent administration 
system. 
An additional precondition for compact and efficient procedures is the absence of veto rights 
or comprehensive consensus requirements. Instead of unanimity rules, a simple or qualified 
(e.g. two-thirds of the votes) majority should suffice to generate a definite decision. This is 
especially true if the independence of both the ICP and the members of its chambers is 
secured. The independence of the ICP board of directors is served if it consists of antitrust 
experts, which are appointed by the leaders of the downward level competition agencies. 
Since comprehensive independence of national and supranational-regional competition 
authorities may be unrealistic
19, the design of the rotation system promotes the independence 
of the ICP if membership in the Governing Chamber is rather short (and, thus, rotation 
frequent) and overlapping (i.e. the chamber does not frequently consist of representatives of 
the same antitrust authorities because the individual periods are not parallel). 
If a second chamber (say Appellation Chamber) is employed in order to constitute an 
appellation body regarding jurisdictional decisions of the Governing Chamber (i.e. selection 
of the lead jurisdiction according to the defined criteria), then an obvious choice would be to 
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let it also consist of representatives of national and supranational-regional competition 
authorities (second and third level) in a rotating way. Of course, jurisdictions must not fill a 
seat in both chambers at the same period of time. Again, some majority rule that prevents 
effective veto rights would be helpful. 
The preceding description of how an ICP could be designed is only exemplary for a number 
of alternative variants. In the context of this study, its main rationale is to demonstrate how a 
concrete operationalisation of a global level authority with the competences allocated and 
delimitated by the combination of mandatory lead jurisdiction model and nondiscrimination 
rule could look like. Therefore (and different from the competence allocation rules), the 
organisational questions are only sketched and not subject to a rigorous analysis. 
4.2 Supranational-Regional Competition Policy Regimes 
The second level represents the first one, which disposes of substantive antitrust competences. 
It consists of joint competition policy regimes of confederations or associations of 
independent countries. Thus, competition policy competences are allocated to a supranational 
level, albeit with limited regional scope. The most natural and comprehensive example is 
represented by the EU Competition Policy System, which contains full-fledged competition 
rules and an experienced antitrust practice. Additionally, there are antitrust provisions and 
agencies on a supranational level in the context of several other multicountry associations. For 
instance, both the Andean Community and the UEMOA (Union Economique et Monétaire 
Ouest Africaine) have implemented their own competition policy agencies, theoretically 
competent in enforcing specifically shaped community competition rules. Practically, 
however, both regimes are currently rather inactive. Comparatively elaborate competition 
policy competences are located at the EFTA (European Free Trade Association) Surveillance 
Authority, whereas free trade and economic integration associations, like NAFTA (North 
American Free Trade Agreement), ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), 
Mercosur (Mercado Común del Conor Sur), CIS (Community of Independent [former soviet] 
States), CARICOM (Carribean Community and Common Market), FTAA (Free Trade Area 
of the Americas), SADC (South African Development Community), or CEN-SAD 
(Community of Sahel-Saharan States), currently only possess at best rudimental antitrust 
provisions. Meanwhile, COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa) is also 
reaching for implementing considerable supranational competition policy competences. 
Following the paragon of the EU, these associations and confederations might develop 
effective competition policy regimes with considerable competition policy competences in the 
course of time. Developed ones represent natural candidates for lead jurisdiction 
appointments as they jurisdictionally include a number of national markets and address 
consumers of different countries. Therefore, they automatically internalise parts of the 
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become the major antitrust enforcement level in the long run – given that worldwide 
economic integration is proceeding. 
Effective competition policy regimes at the supranational-regional level retain full rule-
making, rule-application, and enforcement competences for cross-border anticompetitive 
arrangements and practices if the upward level appoints them to be lead jurisdiction in the 
respective case. Each regime autonomously shapes its own substantive competition rules, 
enforcement institutions, and agencies (including an individual composition of elements of 
the court system, government and independent administration system, and private litigation) 
minus discriminatory provisions and practices, which are excluded by the nondiscrimination 
rule and sanctioned by the global level. Against the background of these non-discriminatory 
institutions and practices, each regime is obliged to consider competitive effects outside its 
territory according to the common welfare of all affected consumers. Apart from that, the 
appointed lead jurisdiction is free to handle the referred case. Of course, it can seek the 
cooperation with and assistance by other – horizontally- or vertically-interrelated – antitrust 
regimes as far as it deems this to be necessary and/or helpful. 
Regarding the vertical (and diagonal) delimitation of competences between the supranational-
regional and the national level, a X-minus rule could provide an efficient and simple 
competence allocation rule. Its content would be that any anticompetitive arrangement or 
practice, which is notified to or detected by a supranational-regional competition policy 
regime, must be allocated downwards if the effects of the respective arrangement or practice 
occur within X or less national antitrust regimes. 
4.3 National Competition Policy Regimes 
Since currently only one effective supranational-regional antitrust regime exists, the major 
level of substantive competition policy is likely to remain at the national level for a 
considerable time. In particular, national competition policy regimes with large and important 
internal markets are likely to be frequently appointed as lead jurisdictions. Above all, this 
refers to the U.S. Antitrust System. However, the competition policy regimes of countries like 
Canada, Australia, Brazil, Japan, Russia, China, India, and many more also represent frequent 
candidates if they qualify for a lead jurisdiction appointment.
20  
If national competition policy regimes are selected to serve as lead jurisdictions, their 
competences are identical with supranational-regional lead jurisdictions. Thus, they handle a 
referred case according to autonomously shaped, applied, and enforced competition rules, 
except of nondiscrimination and comity to extraterritorial markets and consumers, supervised 
                                                 
20 Next to inhabiting the regional gravity of the aggregate turnover of the participating enterprises, a qualification 
to become appointed lead jurisdiction requires the absence of discriminatory provisions and practices as well as 
the proven willingness and experience to employ a world welfare standard (see above). This implies that some 
of the above mentioned countries might face a long way to go until they meet these criteria. Note, however, 
that the possibility to qualify as lead jurisdiction can entail important incentives to develop national 
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by the global regime. Similarly, they are free to develop their individual composition of court 
system, government and independent administration system, and private litigation elements. 
National competition policy regimes can be vertically-interrelated to a supranational-regional 
level (like within the EU) and/or to a subnational-regional level (like in the U.S.) – or lack any 
vertical interrelation concerning substantive competition policy. If a vertically-interrelated 
supranational-regional level exists, an institutional arrangement rule for the upward allocation 
of competences is required. According to the preceding discussion, an X-plus rule seems 
adequate, i.e. each anticompetitive arrangement and practice, which would be subject to 
review by X or more competition policy regimes on a given level, is automatically allocated 
to the upward level. The more countries a supranational-regional level consists of, the more 
caution is required regarding the value of X because a very low X can promote (over-) 
centralising forces.  
If a vertically-interrelated subnational-regional level exists, downward allocation can be 
adequately designed against the background of an X-minus rule. In particular, large countries 
with big internal markets profit from internal decentralisation and, thus, from the existence of 
regional competition policy regimes. According to this reasoning, the maintenance of 
American antitrust federalism is principally beneficial as would be the creation of federalised 
competition policy structures in comparably-sized countries (e.g. Russia or China).  
If no vertically-interrelated subnational-regional level exists, a national competition policy 
regime needs adequate notification thresholds for mergers and interfirm cooperative 
arrangements in order to avoid that jurisdiction is claimed even if no sufficient nexus with the 
(anti-) competitive effects of a business arrangement or practice exists. Concerning per se 
prohibited cartels and abusive modes of behaviour, such thresholds are also necessary but 
naturally do not refer to notification. If a national antitrust regime detects such a cartel or 
mode of behaviour that does not meet the thresholds for a sufficient domestic nexus, it is 
obliged to notify a horizontally- or vertically-interrelated regime with a sufficient nexus 
(according to top level standards). 
4.4 The Subnational-Regional Level 
Subnational-regional competition policy regimes usually do not qualify as lead jurisdictions 
for cross-border antitrust cases. Their domains are local anticompetitive arrangements and 
practices because, in this respect, they can exploit their advantages of being very decentralised 
and very close to the locally-affected markets. In such cases, however, they play an important 
role within a sound multilevel competition policy system. As discussed in the preceding 
section, particularly large countries with considerably segmented internal markets profit from 
downward level competition policy competences. Despite ongoing market globalisation, 
regional and local markets are unlikely to be completely eroded. Therefore, the scope for 
subnational competition policy regimes is a sustainable one. Budzinski: International Competition Policy System  18
However, it must be secured that only anticompetitive arrangements and practices with purely 
local effects fall under the jurisdiction of the regimes at this decentralised level. Here, an 
imbalance of centralising and decentralising forces is more likely to tend towards 
overdecentralisation. Therefore, upward allocation should be based on a competence 
allocation rule, which effectively minimises multiple proceedings at this level. According to 
the preceding economic analysis, an X-plus rule with the value of X close to ‘2’ represents an 
adequate institutional arrangement. Only if the subnational jurisdictions represent 
considerable numbers of consumers (because a very large countries subdivided into 
comparatively large subunits), a larger X might be beneficial. 
Obviously, competition policy regimes at this fourth level represent the most downward ones, 
wherefore the issue of a sufficient nexus between (anti-) competitive impact and the claiming 
of jurisdiction becomes rather sensitive. Therefore, the competition policy regimes at this 
level must implement triggering thresholds constituting jurisdiction and notification duties of 
private parties, which do not violate the safeguards for adequate jurisdiction according to top 
level standards. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper develops a proposal for an international multilevel competition policy system, 
which draws on the insights of the analysis of multilevel systems of institutions. In doing so, 
it targets to contribute to bridge a gap in the current world economic order, i.e. the 
supranational governance of private international restrictions to market competition. Such a 
governance can effectively be designed against the background of a combination of the well-
known nondiscrimination principle and a lead jurisdiction model. Put very briefly, 
competition policy on the global level restricts itself to the selection and appointment of 
appropriate lead jurisdictions for concrete cross-border antitrust cases, while the substantive 
treatment remains within the competence of the existing national and regional-supranational 
antitrust regimes. 
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